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The role of outside experts in local government
Iwona Sobis * and Michiel S. de Vries **
Abstract
Th is paper addresses the role of experts in decision-making in local government. 
Departing from theories about professionals and technocrats in decision-making 
processes, the question arises as to how much inﬂ uence these experts have in policy-
making processes. Th e paper addresses this question and discusses the role of western 
experts in adapting the social security system to EU requirements in a Polish com-
munity under the PHARE program. Th is is a critical case, because comparative ﬁ g-
ures show that local policy-makers in East European countries have a relatively large 
trust in experts and because of the money involved, Polish policy-makers are heavily 
dependent on the experts. Th ese facts result in the expectation that the experts’ advice 
would be humbly accepted. Th e case study shows, however, that many recommenda-
tions do not get a follow-up. Th e degree to which that is the case seems to depend on 
the contents of the recommendations, the arrogance of the experts and the degree to 
which the recommendations are suited to the speciﬁ c characteristics of the recipient’s 
situation.
1. Introduction
In the process of enlargement of the EU, new members had to address a lot of 
demands placed on them by Brussels in order to become eligible for membership. 
In order to accomplish this, the countries were supported by advisory agencies 
from diﬀ erent EU countries, which could assist in transforming procedures and 
programs in such a way that these were suited to the practices of the European 
Union. Little is known until now about the way such processes evolved. Th e 
investigation can, however, have important practical and important theoretical 
ramiﬁ cations.
*   University of Skövde, Sweden
** Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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In theories on public policy processes, the role of professionals, rationalism 
and technocracy has been one of those areas that has been widely debated. Th e 
subject belongs to the classic themes in the study of public policy. On the one 
hand, scholars are seen who promote such professionalism: Lasswell, one of the 
founders of policy sciences, promoted policy studies by pointing to the need of 
making rational judgements on policy questions (Lasswell, 1948: 122). Already 
in 1945, Herbert Simon published his “administrative behaviour” and he became 
one of the main advocates of rationality, especially procedural, although he rec-
ognised the limitations in practice. From the 1960s onward, Yehezkel Dror advo-
cated a “scientiﬁ c” approach in policy analysis (Dror 1967, 1989), and Daniel Bell 
promoted the scientiﬁ c and rational approach toward problem-solving. In the 
1970s, Giddens called the trust in professionals a bargain with modernity which 
only seems to increase (Giddens, 1990). At some point in the growing complex-
ity of social problems necessitating such development (Weiss, 1992) and others 
investigated the changing role of professionals (Brint, 1994).
On the other hand, more censorious arguments were also heard during the 
whole period. In the 60s, there was criticism about the rise of technocracy as 
expressed by Ellul, Dahrendorf, and Habermas who objected to the possibility of 
improving the policy-making processes by increasing the amount of information. 
Later on, they were accompanied by famous scholars like Illich, March, Cohen 
and Olsen, and Dunleavy who disputed the added value of expertise and pointed 
to the political and subjective nature of policy processes. Since then some criti-
cal case studies appeared on the role that professionals play in policy processes 
In the 90s, books with catchy titles such as Th e Tyranny of Experts appeared, and 
criticism arose around the managerial view on policy-making.
Th e discussion about the actual, expected and desired role of experts in 
policy-making is far from concluded. Are they the powerful forces behind policy 
changes or are they just additional instruments in the hands of decision-makers? 
Th e next section of this paper goes into the main theoretical arguments in this 
discussion. It will be argued that this literature is too general in scope, neglect-
ing that there might be variations in the impact of diﬀ erent experts. Th is is seen, 
for instance, in the absence of a distinction in the literature between outside and 
inside experts. Although we would have liked to base the research on theories 
speciﬁ cally directed at outside experts, we have to rely on theories on experts 
in general. One of the most important diﬀ erences between outside experts and 
inside experts is, of course, that among the former the knowledge of speciﬁ c 
circumstances and culture is less than among the latter. As we will show, the way 
these outside experts deal with this is crucial to their eﬀ ectiveness.
Th is paper presents a case study about the role of outside experts in Poland 
and argues the speciﬁ c problems related to their advice and the variance in their 
approaches. Th is raises the question how to explain the varying impact of experts. 
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Is it the content of their work that is determinative, or is this a minor factor com-
pared to the nature of the relation between the experts and local policy-makers; 
e.g., the a priori trust the latter have in the opinions of such experts and their 
dependency on experts’ advice?
With regard to their reputation, the third section of this paper presents ﬁ g-
ures on the trust that local policy-makers in East and West European countries 
have in the recommendations made by experts. We use data from an international 
research project, indicative for the opinions of those people who actually develop 
and are responsible for local policies. Th ey were interviewed and asked how they 
judge the desired role of professionals and expertise. Th is part of the study will 
reveal striking diﬀ erences between local policy-makers in diﬀ erent countries. 
One ﬁ nding will be that local elites in transitional countries have much more 
trust in experts than local elites in old democracies. With regard to the degree 
that local leaders are dependent on experts, our case study investigates a policy 
process in which the money involved and the impact of the outcomes are both 
indicative of a high degree of dependence. Th e question is, if even in such cir-
cumstances, in which one would expect local policy-makers to humbly accept the 
experts’ advice, still variance in the acceptance of this advice is visible. If that can 
be shown, the content of the experts’ advice is likely to play an important role.
Regarding the contents of expertise, there is increasing literature that ex-
plores the actual work that experts do. Th e preliminary conclusion to be derived 
from that scholarly work is that experts are not so much making recommenda-
tions based on an analysis of the problems in the policy at hand, but that they 
should rather be seen as so-called “standard-setters” (Brunsson & Jacobson, 
2000). Experts from the EU, ILO, World Bank and other international organisa-
tions seem to be primarily occupied with transforming public policies in order 
to adapt them and make them compatible to their standards. Th e in-depth case 
study on the developments in the Polish city of Lodz shows that some experts can 
indeed be denominated as standard setters, but that there are also experts who 
listen, investigate the problem at hand and base their advice on the speciﬁ c situ-
ation. Th ey had to assist in order for Poland to qualify for the EU. It concerned 
a large project: over a period of nine years, the EU invested 1.7 billion ECU in it 
and a whole army of EU and ILO-experts ﬂ ooded the country (Sobis, 2002). Th is 
made it possible to investigate the style of those experts and the degree to which 
the city of Lodz adapted its policies according to the experts’ recommendations. 
Because of the high reputation experts have in the new democracies and the 
dependence on them as regards Poland’s admission as a EU member, one would 
expect that every recommendation the experts made would be acted upon almost 
automatically. As the case study will show, the real picture is more complicated. 
We ﬁ nish this paper with some reﬂ ections about the consequences of the empiri-
cal outcomes.
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2. The theoretical debate about
the role of expertise in policy-making processes
Th e debate around the role of experts and expertise in policy-making processes 
deals with persons and processes, empirical trends and normative judgements 
over the role of those people whose authority is knowledge-based instead of 
based on the representation of interests and the volume of the groups sharing this 
interest, as is the case with politicians. Experts are, in the words of Brint (1994: 
131-132), a highly trained professional staﬀ  working in central institutional do-
mains, either on a salaried or contractual basis. Th ey also include professionals in 
the surrounding institutional arenas of scientiﬁ c research, cultural and commu-
nication services, social service, medical, legal and educational organisations.
In the debate about these people, two subjects are central. First, the question 
is what experts actually do and second, what their impact is on the policy-mak-
ing process.
2.1 Experts as standard-setters limiting policy-makers’ choices
Th e debate about experts results in a prominent question, namely, “What is it 
that such experts do?” Th e most obvious answer is, of course, that they help to 
improve the situation at hand. You have a problem you don’t know how to solve? 
Hire someone who does know and has the answers you do not yet have – an ex-
pert. From the experts’ point of view, this is the only justiﬁ ed answer.
Nils Brunsson and Bengt Jacobsson provide an alternative answer to that 
question. In their eyes, it is primarily standardisation and legitimacy that is at 
stake. Th ey pose that standardisation generates a strong element of global order 
in the modern capitalist countries because people and organisations following 
the same standards in the world see standardisation as a form of regulation 
and control that allows one to understand “similarity and homogeneity among 
people and organisations far apart from one another” (2000: 1). Th ere are many 
organisations which refer to themselves as standard-setters. Th e European Un-
ion, International World Bank or International Labour Organisation can serve 
as examples. Jacobsson argues that “Standardisation is linked to expertise and is 
usually motivated by the view that there are some persons who know best. In this 
way, standardisation is given legitimacy” (2000: 40). Usually, expert knowledge 
is stored in the form of rules that are, e.g., voluntarily accepted by international 
multi-standards organisations.
Many decisions in the EU develop through trans-national networks involv-
ing several diﬀ erent levels and actors in both the public and the private sector. Th e 
EU Commission relies frequently on the expert knowledge found in companies, 
interest groups, the civil service of member countries, etc. Th ere is an extensive 
interchange of information and views among companies, interest groups, civil 
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servants and politicians. Th e explanation for this is partly that eﬀ orts to promote 
integration in the EU have focused primarily on the economy and creation of an 
internal market (Jacobsson, 2000: 47).
With regard to the EU, Jacobsson argues that its legitimacy in decision-mak-
ing is derived from the idea of a free market. Consequently, decisions are limited 
to the essential areas for guaranteeing such a market. Th e legitimacy of this free 
market is based on its utility. Experts who make good decisions in their respec-
tive ﬁ elds emphasise that the free market is good for everyone. Th e legitimacy of 
EU decisions is based on the assumption that the sector networks in which these 
decisions emerge are best at solving the problems that may arise: “It is less impor-
tant to know who is speaking on behalf of whom than who possesses the neces-
sary knowledge” (2000: 47). Th us, decisions are legitimated by expert knowledge, 
although it is diﬃ  cult to ascribe neutrality to them. Th e reason is that in Eastern 
Europe, we can observe an increasingly important role for such professionals who 
in fact have limited local politicians in their choices by the technical information 
provided by experts. Th is trend can be also explained in terms of “dis-embedding 
mechanisms” (Giddens, 1991: 17-20).
Th ere is also an opposite view: that experts are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the market value of their skills, which in turn is increasingly de-
pendent on the degree to which they can use their skills in order to support the 
politicians’ interests in their service. In the modern nation-state, the state legis-
lators possess hierarchical authority to regulate certain matters within national 
borders. In this sense, state legislators are not the standard-setters but rather the 
rule-setters. It is the group of international experts that are the standardisers. Th e 
standardisers diﬀ er from the nation-state in many respects:
Standardisers cannot claim hierarchical authority, nor can they impose 
sanctions. Th ey oﬀ er standards – which could be described as pieces 
of general advice oﬀ ered to large numbers of potential adopters. (...) 
Since standards are presented as voluntary, standardisers oft en have to 
expend considerable eﬀ ort convincing other people that it is in their in-
terest, either now or in the long term, to accept the standards (Brunsson 
and Jacobsson, 2000: 2).
“Standards” are understood as “rules about what those who adopt them 
should do, even if this only involves saying something or designating something 
in a particular way” (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000: 4-8). Many rules and types of 
advice can be described as standards. Brunsson and Jacobsson distinguish three 
types of standards: (a) Standards about being something, which classify things or 
actors in a standardised way; e.g., what a telephone is. (b) Standards about do-
ing something; e.g., how organisations should behave, what should be included 
in diﬀ erent types of educational programmes, what states should do about their 
ﬁ nancial problems, etc. (c) Standards about having something, which refer to 
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things we should have; e.g., a modern state should have democracy, a constitution 
and an educational system.
Some standards become institutionalised if actors take it for granted that 
they should be followed. Kjell Arne Røvik (1996) deﬁ nes “institutionalised stand-
ards” as follows:
Institutionalised standards are prescriptions, but the extent to which 
they give detailed practical speciﬁ cations for organising varies consid-
erably. Some are vague ideas that allow a lot of room for each individ-
ual organisation to give them its own interpretation. Other institution-
alised standards, however, provide more detailed prescriptions for how 
organisational activities should be carried out (...) Institutionalised 
standards are not prescriptions for building a whole complex organisa-
tion. On the contrary, they apply to small parts of the organisation and 
may therefore be regarded as institutionalised “building blocks.” Th us, 
an organisation is oft en also a multi-standard organisation because it 
has usually adapted many institutionalised standards over a period of 
time from various institutionalised environments (Røvik, 1996: 142).
Assuming that institutionalised standards are ideas that travel in time and 
space and “have their day”, then “an institutionalised standard is an organisational 
fashion that has its day” (Røvik, 1996: 166). In other words, a fashion that receives 
a social authorisation as the most advanced, eﬀ ective, rational and modern meth-
od and strategy to organise work, and that is well-known in the organisations of 
highly developed Western countries Røvik calls “organisational fashion”. Hence, 
the Western experts who spread such popular and institutionalised standards 
might be called “fashion-setters” (Sobis, 2002: 36).
2.2 The infl uence of experts
Th e second question is how successful experts are in such standard – or fashion-
settings. What is their inﬂ uence in policy-making processes? Scholars seeing an 
increased inﬂ uence oft en talk about technocracy being the dominant form of 
decision-making nowadays. Because of the increasing complexity of present-day 
problems, one cannot solve these problems by just deliberating and deciding 
about a program. Research has to be done, information gathered and relations 
between variables have to be taken into account. Th e interdependence and dy-
namics of problems has led to an increasing need for expert-analysis and con-
sequently of an increasing inﬂ uence of people knowledgeable about and able to 
conduct such analysis, that is, experts (see a/o Bell, Giddens and Weiss). Because 
such professionals possess a quality not found among policy-makers themselves, 
and the latter oft en hardly comprehend the technical details nor the impact of 
the choices they have to make, they increasingly rely on and therefore become 
dependent on people they assume do know, who have had the scientiﬁ c educa-
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tion to know and/or work in an organisation specialising in the problems at hand. 
Th is has in the eyes of these scholars resulted in the rise of what is called “tech-
nocratic decision-making” or the meritocracy in which the most highly educated 
form the elite (cf. Michael Young).
Some judge this development to be positive because it disposes of the irra-
tional, ineﬀ ective and ineﬃ  cient decision-making processes characterising many 
policy-making processes in the past, and the possibility of relegating the ideologi-
cal conﬂ icts by using the tools available to do better (Bell, 1960: 1). Others point 
to the negative side eﬀ ects of this development in terms of decreasing possibilities 
for democracy and the fading primacy of politics in which conﬂ icting interests 
and power are central (Ellul, 1964).
Irrespective of the moral judgement, scholars seem to agree that the trend 
towards technocracy is real and irreversible. Th e arguments are based on the 
increasing number of people educated at universities and polytechnics, the grow-
ing number of experts working in and around government, the inﬂ uence of 
think tanks and advisory committees composed of professionals, the increasing 
dominance of problems related to so-called “organised complexity” (Bell, 1960: 
29), and the visibility of this inﬂ uence in the many, chunky and for non-expertss 
oft en incomprehensible technical reports accompanying policy processes. Such 
reports are not only becoming more important because of the complexity of 
issues, but also because of the emergent need for impact assessments, perform-
ance measurement, and in general the need for transparency. Th e technological 
advancements in the last couple of decades made possible, what, in the early days 
of scientiﬁ c management, could only be done in a very limited way; that is, to 
rationalise policy processes and in the end to rationalise society.
Regardless of the persuasiveness of this argument, not everyone seems to 
be convinced. Recently, a growing body of literature appeared that points to a 
diminishing role of experts and expertise. Lakof, for instance, tells us that “Profes-
sionals lack political resources to exercise determining inﬂ uence. In no actual so-
ciety, scientiﬁ c or technological knowledge is considered to be a suﬃ  cient source 
of moral or legal authority” (in Brint, 1994: 137). Nelkin (1992) concludes that 
technical analysis is not likely to change anyone’s mind, and that major events 
are more likely to eﬀ ect opinions than technical scientiﬁ c reports. Wilding (1982) 
sees the power of professionals only to the degree they are granted this power 
by politicians which is strictly in the interest of the latter. Brint put it as follows: 
“Th e idea that the technically able increasingly make important political deci-
sions is fallacious” (1994: 18) … “Experts for the most part have limited mandates 
and limited inﬂ uence” (1994: 135) ….“except on narrowly technical matters…. 
On matters of larger public interest, politicians are in a position to claim higher 
priorities and more binding responsibilities, priorities and responsibilities that 
override the mere conviction of expert knowledge” (1994: 135-136).
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He notices a shift  from trustee professionalism to expert professionalism. 
Th e former is dominated, in Max Weber’s terminology, by substantial rationality 
based on a public outlook inﬂ uenced by noblesse oblige, an emphasis on charac-
ter and trust, and an insistence on cultivated judgement (Brint, 1994: 8). In the 
last century, this kind of professionalism is said to be replaced by a kind of pro-
fessionalism in which the surplus value is measured by its market value. He talks 
about the marketisation of professionalism in which the distinctive contribution 
to society at large is no longer crucial, but rather the skills involved in their work. 
One of Brints’ conclusions is that professional development must not be seen in 
occupational terms, but in relation to the development of markets for profes-
sional services and in relation to the interests of organisations that employ large 
numbers of professionals.
Th e consequence is that idealism and humanistic culture have been re-
placed by materialism and market-consciousness (1994: 14). Th e recent age of 
expertise has been an age of relatively unrestrained consumer markets and cor-
porate power. (1994: 17). Th is development resulted in a decline of independent 
knowledge and increased dependency on those who can aﬀ ord to pay for their 
skills; that is, the corporations and in the public sector the politicians with their 
oft en one-sided interests. It is not as Ellul says, that the politician is at the mercy 
of the professional, (Ellul, 1964: 258), but that the professional is increasingly at 
the mercy of the politicians. Th e inﬂ uence of experts is encapsulated within the 
institutional context that forestalls the outcomes of their analyses and recom-
mendations which run counter to the interests of their “clients” (cf. Massey, 1988). 
As Brint (1994: 145) tells us, experts are also increasingly naive, mistaking politi-
cal applause for their ideas as a sign of rationality of their ideas rather than of the 
political utility of their ideas.
Underneath this discussion about the inﬂ uence of experts, there is a more 
fundamental one which oft en remains implicit in the debate: whether the con-
tents of professional expertise is in any way important for the development of 
eﬀ ective, eﬃ  cient and legitimate policies. Another question is whether the policy 
process can be seen as a rational process in which goal-achievement and the us-
age of policy instruments can be technically optimised by the simple standardisa-
tion referred to in the previous section in order to eradicate the societal problems 
confronting policy-makers. It seems that those scholars seeing a tendency toward 
technocracy indeed think this to be the case. If one sees such processes as politi-
cal and subjective – involving conﬂ icting interests about the problem deﬁ nition, 
the weighing of diﬀ erent eﬀ ects or in case the costs and beneﬁ ts are unequally 
divided – or if one sees such processes as irrational and unpredictable, thus be-
ing more dependent on the speciﬁ c contingencies, the idea that regardless of the 
contents of the advice, experts have a decisive role, surpassing the provision of 
legitimising information to be used at the policy-makers’ advantage in case of 
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conﬂ ict, makes little sense. In that case the role of experts will be judged to be 
modest. Th erefore, the ideas about the increasing inﬂ uence of technocrats and 
the desirability thereof, is likely to tell something about one’s view on the aspects 
deemed important in policy-making. To a certain extent, the same goes for the 
view of the marginal inﬂ uence of expertise and the desirability thereof. Th is 
seems to be associated with a view on policy-making in which the political and 
subjective aspects are deemed crucial.
In conclusion, there are two theoretical opposite opinions on the role of 
experts in policy-making processes. Th e ﬁ rst sees an increasingly important role 
for such professionals with politicians being limited in their choices by the stand-
ardized information provided by experts. Th e second sees the opposite trend and 
professionals increasingly being dependent on the market value of their skills, 
which in turn is increasingly dependent on the degree to which they are use 
these skills to support the interests of the politicians. Th e ﬁ rst view seems to be 
based on a managerial perspective where the rationalisation of policy processes 
is central. Th e second view seems to be associated with a more political approach 
to policy processes and a conception that technical information has to ﬁ t the 
dominant political views in order to have an impact.
3. The case of Western advisers in a Polish municipality
Th e interesting thing about the debate outlined above is that it does not neces-
sarily lie in ﬁ nding the ultimate answer to what in theory is the real nature of 
policy processes and the role of experts therein. When such an answer in theory 
is not (yet) available, one way out is to analyse the practice in actual policy-mak-
ing processes, to assess the opinions of those people involved and to conduct 
in-depth assessments of policy processes in which outside experts are involved. 
Th is is the course of action taken below. We will do an in-depth analysis of the 
impact of experts coming from Western European countries on policies in a mu-
nicipality called Lodz in a Middle European country, Poland, with regard to the 
adaptation of Polish social security policies to EU-norms in order to assess how 
such expertise works out in practice and whether the recommendations based 
on such expertise are always acted upon. Th e research, conducted as part of the 
PhD project by the ﬁ rst author of this paper, was based on EU oﬃ  cial documents, 
international reports about the transition in the Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Polish legislation of labour market relations, statistics of unemployment, and 48 
interviews with local politicians and representatives of the agencies involved. 
We will ﬁ rst argue that the circumstances are favourable for a decisive impact 
of outside experts on the policies underway in this city. Th e amount of money 
involved as well as the serious consequences in case Poland could not adapt and 
the trust in experts among local elites in transition countries in general, results in 
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the expectation that the experts’ advice would be followed almost automatically, 
irrespective of its content.
3.1. Indicators for a large dependence
Shortly aft er 1989, about 86,000 unemployed people were looking for work and 
assistance within the Employment Agency of Lodz, the textile-industry city in 
Poland. Unemployment, unknown under socialism, presented a new and major 
problem to the local authorities. Th e means to counter unemployment was lack-
ing; this along with bad room-conditions and a staﬀ  unprepared to deal with 
unemployment provided the starting point. It further illustrates that adapting to 
the new labour market and labour protection rules characteristic of free market 
economies was tough.
About the same time, the Council of Ministers of the European Union de-
cided to assist Poland and Hungary with sweeping changes in the framework of 
the PHARE programme. PHARE is an acronym for Poland and Hungary: Action 
for the Restructuring of the Economy (Council Regulation (EEC) N° 3909/89 of 
December 18, 1989). Th e programme was the world’s largest grant assistance ef-
fort to Central and Eastern Europe, and the ﬁ rst programme to support reforms 
of those sectors of the economy of beneﬁ ciary countries perceived to be of key 
importance in the proper functioning of a market economy (See references to the 
PHARE Programme). In Poland, the EU assistance concerned: (1) Agriculture, (2) 
Restructuring of Economy and Privatisation, (3) Regional Development, (4) En-
vironment Protection, (5) Infrastructure, (6) Education, Training and Research, 
(7) Labour Market and Labour Protection, (8) Administration and Local govern-
ment, (9) Health Care, and (10) Multi-sectional Programme. All the sectional 
programmes were implemented during 1990 – 1994. Th e EU documents indicate 
that the national PHARE programme for Poland during 1989 – 97 supported the 
process of economic transition and institutional reform according to the new cir-
cumstances. Aft er 1997, the aim was to prepare Poland for joining the European 
Union. Th e PHARE program can be seen as an EU institution that displayed a 
“constraint/freedom duality” towards Poland. Th e Polish authority voluntarily ac-
cepted participation in the programme because Western assistance was wanted 
and expected to be in conformity with the Roundtable negotiations. Neverthe-
less, Poland as a beneﬁ ciary country, had to respect the plan of procedure for EU 
assistance to show that it shared respect for the Community’s common norms. 
Aft er signing the Europe Agreement, the Community reinforced Polish economic 
reform, industrial restructuring, and stimulation of trade and commerce to pre-
pare the country to join the EU. Th is implies that there was heavy pressure on 
Poland to adapt and accept the proposed changes (Sobis, 2002: 73 and 171).
It appears as though Polish authorities took the EU standards for granted, 
probably because they were based on “expert’s knowledge” and voluntarily ac-
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cepted by member states. At the national level, the Labour Code was amended, 
EU labour market norms were introduced, and legislation altered with regard 
to (1) the deﬁ nition of unemployed persons and the protection of unemployed 
persons; (2) the organisational structure of the Public Employment Service; and 
(3) the regulations for employment, unemployment and unemployment beneﬁ ts. 
Th e legislators implemented the new rules, laid down the amendments to the 
bills, and approached the EU/ILO’s highly institutionalised standards gradually, 
somewhat by experimental learning due to EU assistance within the framework 
of PHARE programme, the actual situation on the labour market and the signals 
from employment agencies. In 1993, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
established the National Labour Oﬃ  ce (NLO) – the highest administrative body 
coordinating adaptive process. In the framework of the PHARE sectional pro-
gramme dealing with the labour market and labour protection policy, the EU 
standard-setters, in close cooperation with the ILO fashion-setters, provided as-
sistance to secure political goals.
Th e cooperation between the Polish government and the EU resulted in the 
preparation of an assistance programme by the ILO. Th e aim was to spread ILO 
basic organisational fashions of Western employment agencies and to adapt them 
to the organisational structure of the Polish public employment service. Conse-
quently, the ILO consultants in collaboration with the authority of NLO prepared 
a series of training programmes.
First, the chief administrators were trained through discussions with super-
visors and Western consultants. Th is happened at the Ministry for Labour. Th e 
ﬁ rst staﬀ  training courses started later on. About twenty courses were addressed 
to the staﬀ  of the employment service in Poland in order to raise its competency 
in market economy conditions. Danish, English, French, German and Swedish 
consultants conducted the training programmes. In March 1995, the ILO started 
the second stage of the two-year training programme. Its aim was to improve the 
level of staﬀ  competence and the public employment service’s organisation. Many 
courses were about promotion and starting one’s own business under catchy titles 
like “Promotion of Small Enterprise in the Lodz Region”, “Vocational Counselling 
and Promotion of Small Enterprise”, and “Individual Enterprise in the Practice 
of DLOs”. Lecturers from the University of Lodz, the authority of the state and 
municipal governments, and representatives of various ﬁ nancial institutions 
conducted lectures in collaboration with a consultant from London. Aft erwards, 
the ILO programme started another series of seminars dealing with “Educational 
aspects of women’s adaptation in a situation of unemployment on a labour mar-
ket”. Th e speciﬁ c problems of women’s unemployment were discussed in topical 
blocks under the heading of “Th e general problems of women’s unemployment 
when creating a market economy”, “Th e educational activities for women on the 
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regional labour markets”, and “Th e chances, threats, and support concerning 
women’s educational activities”.
Th e amount of money involved and the need to be successful in adapting 
to EU regulations in order to become a member of the EU, are indicative of the 
dependence of Polish authorities on the experts brought in from the EU to ac-
commodate the transition process.
3.2. The inclination to listen to experts
A second factor important for understanding the Polish position toward outside 
experts is that Poland is a new democracy and, as will be argued in this section, 
local elites in such countries place a relatively large trust in experts’ opinions.
Since 1989, the opinions and background of local elites in East and West 
European countries are measured by a large scale survey conducted within the 
so-called “Democracy and Local Governance Research” project. Th is project is 
coordinated by Krzysztof Ostrowski (University of Pultusk), Henry Teune (Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania) and Lars Strömberg (University of Göteborg); the second 
author of this paper participated in this project. In all countries in volved, more 
than 20 communities comprising between 25,000 and 250,000 inhabitants were 
selected at ran dom. Within each of these communities, about 15 political leaders 
and 15 leading oﬃ  cials were intervie wed, resulting in a database of over 16,000 
respondents in 665 communities. Th e interviews were carried out in 1989 – 1991, 
repea ted in 1995 – 1996 and again in 1999 – 2001. For Western European coun-
tries, oft en the only data available is from the period 1995 – 1996. In this paper, 
we use data from former East European countries, such as Poland, Lithuania 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan and West and European countries, such as the USA, Germany, the 
UK, Spain, Netherlands, Japan and Taiwan. From these countries, we have survey 
data from 1994 – 1996 which encompassed 9,468 local oﬃ  cials.
Among the respondents, senior politicians include the mayor, aldermen and 
leading representatives, oft en local party leaders, in the local council. Th e top 
administrators comprise the town clerk, members of the management team and 
the heads of departments. Th ey are people who prepare, develop, decide about 
and take care of the implementation of policies and programs that directly aﬀ ect 
the life of the people in the community. Th ey make decisions about subsidies and 
grants, local taxes, public and social improve ments, safety, culture and recreation, 
housing, education and health policies. It is these educated people, oft en having a 
university or polytechnic education who are what some call the local elite (Jacob, 
1993). Although their autonomy varies over countries, depending among other 
things on the degree of decentralisation, all are in some way inﬂ uen tial for the 
daily life of many people.
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Th e interviews/questionnai res were standardised in order to make valid 
comparisons possible. In the research for the Democracy and Local Govern-
ance Project, the most inﬂ uential local politicians and public administrators 
in the selected municipalities were asked their opinion about 40 statements. 
Th ese questions regarded central-local relations, eco nomic equality, values and 
norms, economic growth and the central variable in this paper, trust in experts. 
Th e respondents were presented a number of statements with which they could 
answer in a simple objective way: completely disagree, disagree, agree or com-
pletely agree.
One of those statements refers to the trust the respondent has in experts. It 
reads as follows: “Most decisions should be left  to the judgement of experts”. It is 
about trust, because trust is, as Hardin interprets it, a three-part relation involv-
ing encapsulated interests: A trusts B to do X. Th is speciﬁ c trust relates to the 
knowledge of A that B will take A’s inter est into account when doing X. Hardin 
talks about a high degree of trust, when he says, “I trust you because I think it is 
in your interest to attend my interest in the relevant matter” (2002: 4) and “What 
matters for trust is not merely my expectation that you will act in certain ways, 
but also my belief that you have the relevant motivations to act in those ways, 
that you deliberately take my interests into account because they are mine” (2002: 
11). In this case, A is composed of local policy-makers, B consists of experts and 
X relates to their judgement in decision-making. Because decision-making is of 
such crucial importance, in this context we can speak of high-level trust when 
local elites agree with the statement.
Figure 1
Local elites’ opinions about the inﬂ uence of experts in 1995
* Th e old democracies involved are the USA, Germany, the UK, Spain, Netherlands, Japan and Tai-
wan. Th e new democracies involved are Poland, Lithuania Hungary, Czech republic, Slovakia, Th e 
newest democracies involved are Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan
Whether or not and by which percentage of local elites experts are trusted 
in this way is shown in ﬁ gure 1. Th is ﬁ gure shows the percentage of all respond-
ents in the diﬀ erent countries in agreement with the statement. Overall, there are 
as many members of the local elite trusting experts as there are that distrust those 
people (last column). It shows also, for instance, that in old democracies, such as 
the Netherlands this kind of trust is rare. About 32 percent of the local elite in 
Most decisions should be made by experts
old
democracies*
new
democracies*
newest
democracies* Total
(strongly) disagree 67,19 33,24 41,63 50,00
(strongly) agree 32,56 66,75 58,37 50,00
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western countries agree with the statement that decision-making should be left  
to the judgement of experts.
However, in the new and newest democracies this high-level trust in experts 
is much more common. Especially in the Central European transition countries 
(among them, Poland) on average two-thirds of all respondents would prefer it 
if decision-making would be left  to the judgement of experts. In the newest de-
mocracies, still nearly 60 percent has this opinion. It seems that especially in these 
countries where the social and economic problems are huge compared to those in 
Western democracies, experts are seen as the ultimate resource in improving the 
situation. Th e reputation of experts is good, and if possible they are hired and put 
into service. In Poland, a transition country, this trust in experts in general is also 
high. All this is indicative that the Lodz case is a critical case for the theory. Th e 
ﬁ nancial dependence of the local community was high considering the amount 
of money involved within the Phare program, the dependency on the outcome 
(eligibility for EU membership) was high and the a priori trust in experts was 
relatively high. Al this resulted in the expectation that local oﬃ  cials will follow up 
on every advice given by those experts.
3.3. The actual role of the outside experts
But how did the oﬃ  cials in Lodz actually perceive the impact of the outside ex-
perts who were ﬂ ooding them? Th ere were reactions that were congruent to our 
expectations given the dependence and a priori trust in experts. Th e interviewed 
oﬃ  cials perceived the Swedish, German and Danish expertise as extremely useful 
in creating a modern employment service. Th e staﬀ  could almost immediately 
adapt to most of the recommendation, and it felt direct improvements in its 
working methods. Th e way the Swedish proceeded seems to be important. Th e 
Swedish consultants trained the employment service’s staﬀ  in Lodz and Gothen-
burg. Th e Lodzian delegation had visited the employment agency of Gothenburg 
to observe how they worked with unemployed persons, what equipment they 
had, and other important details that could provide them with some inspiration 
for the organisational changes within the employment service of Lodz. Th e re-
spondents recalled:
When we had most serious problems how to serve the unemployed and 
how to pay out unemployment beneﬁ ts in the simplest way, we received 
assistance from the Swedish consultants. […] No one could help us so 
much than they did. Th ey came four times to Lodz from September 
1993 to June 1995. Th eir visits were important for us. We had no pat-
terns, ideas, and theory how to organise work with unemployed persons 
within the oﬃ  ce. […] My visit in the Employment Agency of Gothen-
burg had conﬁ rmed my suppositions that a part of the Swedish solu-
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tions would be possible to adapt in Lodz certainly, in the framework of 
our employment and unemployment rules (Interview 21/3, 7, 8).
Our Swedish colleagues helped us paying attention to our needs. Th ey 
did not impose their will upon us. Th ey neither evaluated our work 
nor the oﬃ  ce’s organisational structure in comparison how they did it 
in Sweden. Th ey gave us advice and pointed at other solutions. Th ey 
admitted that our oﬃ  ce was in a very speciﬁ c situation. It was impossi-
ble to compare our situation with other labour oﬃ  ces in the world. We 
could not follow any patterns or models that worked correct in other 
oﬃ  ces (Interview 22/8).
Th e consultants from Sweden prompted us to improve our work. Th ey 
schooled us within the oﬃ  ce and on the conferences or courses. Th e 
meetings with them were to our advantage (Interview 24/12).
Th e Swedish consultants had some information about our unemploy-
ment and it was easier for them to understand our problems. On the 
other hand, we were very open to their suggestions (Interview 17/80).
Th e personnel appreciated the Swedish consultants’ friendly manner of as-
sisting, of their understanding for the speciﬁ c situation within the oﬃ  ce and their 
respect for their Polish colleagues’ eﬀ orts to improve service to the unemployed. 
Th e personnel had to learn new working methods from step one. Th e minimal 
modiﬁ cations showed that most Swedish organisational fashions worked correct-
ly within the oﬃ  ce, and were adapted into the oﬃ  ce’s organisational structure. In 
general, respondents shared the opinion that the Swedish organisational fashions 
improved their working methods with clients, and they positively aﬀ ected organ-
isational changes within the District Labour Oﬃ  ces of Lodz (DLO) and essen-
tially contributed to elaborating the model oﬃ  ce in harmony with Polish rules. 
It was not surprising that the state authority spread these organisational fashions 
further in the framework of cooperation with other DLOs in Poland. Th us, the 
Swedish organisational fashions of the employment agency helped to standardise 
activity within the employment service of Lodz, and proved to be of central im-
portance for creating a network of Public Employment Service (PES) in Poland. 
In this way, the Swedish “organisational fashions” travelled in time and space and 
brought about the organisational similarities of Polish employment service.
Th e Germans provided the Centre of Vocational Information (CVI) with 
oﬃ  ce-equipment; furniture, computers, printers, copying machines and video 
while the Voivodship Labour Oﬃ  ce (VLO) ﬁ nanced the reconditioning works 
and installation of equipment on the area of 130-150 m.2 Th e German organisa-
tional fashions of the CVI had a complementary value to the Swedish ones. Th ey 
came to Lodz when the Swedes had prepared the groundwork for implementing 
the CVI. According to Røvik, the German prototype of CVI was “an institution-
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alised building block” consisting of many “institutionalised standards” (Røvik, 
1996: 142). Th ey enlarged the staﬀ ’s knowledge about the service of vocational 
counselling and contributed to its modern pattern in the Western meaning. Th e 
staﬀ  had reproduced the vocational counselling over time, its “social form” aft er 
1989 clustered around the same goals as in socialism. However, the organisational 
fashion has been altered and adapted to a market economy. Th e German insti-
tutionalised standards of the CVI travelled from city to city, and contributed to 
create the similar organisational fashion of the CVI in Poland.
Danish consultants joined the ILO programme in the autumn of 1994. Th ey 
conducted staﬀ  training until 1997 in close cooperation with the National Labour 
Oﬃ  ce of Warsaw. Th e ﬁ rst course focused on the marketing of the employment 
agency based on Danish, English and Swedish literature. Th e courses were ad-
dressed to future trainers in marketing of the employment agency and labour 
matching. Th e NLO bestowed on one person from Lodz the right to conduct 
internal training within the employment service in order to prepare placement 
oﬃ  cers to negotiate with employers about earnings to the unemployed, create 
workplaces for former prisoners, the disabled, young, etc (VLO 1997: 13). Th e 
general understanding for marketing implicated the oﬃ  ce’s further improvement 
in the adaptive strategies. (Interviews 22/15; 24/103) In the opinion of the re-
spondents, the Swedish, German and Danish assistance had an especially positive 
eﬀ ect on the adaptive process.
Th e English consultant started the second stage of the ILO training pro-
grammes, aimed at promoting free enterprise, granting loans to employers and 
training for those starting their own business and other important issues con-
nected to private enterprise. Following the respondents’ narrative about Eng-
land, they have non-governmental ﬁ rms that sign agreements with employment 
agencies to start a “simulating business”. Th ose ﬁ rms have a right to monitor the 
newly established ﬁ rms/cooperatives and oversee what they did with money they 
received from the employment agency to start their business. One of the Polish 
respondents made the following comment on that model, proposed by the Eng-
lish consultant:
Th ey are very professional [in promoting enterprise], but we cannot 
work in this way. It is too early for us. Th ey look at unemployment in 
a diﬀ erent way. Look, they have some regions in which they establish 
the “simulating ﬁ rms” to counteract unemployment. Th e ﬁ rms produce 
nothing but work for people. Certainly, it could be useful in Poland, 
especially in those regions, where the unemployment rate is 40 per cent, 
to let those people do something, but giving them just money is destruc-
tive (Interview 15/89,90).
In the opinion of the respondents, the English prototype was highly useful 
to counteract unemployment but inappropriate to actual Polish conditions. In 
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their opinion, systemic transition was not suﬃ  ciently advanced. Materialisation 
of the idea required further reforms; e.g., the reform of the banking system and 
the establishment of new institutions to promote such enterprises. Secondly, the 
“simulating business” was impossible to implement into the employment service 
because the rules recommended ways to promote enterprises, start one’s own 
business and grant loans other than the English ones. Th us, the English organi-
sational fashion had to be rejected. However, the respondents thought that they 
could be used in the future if the legislative body had changed the rules. (Inter-
views 18/39 and 24/24) In Røvik’s terms, the Polish personnel had stored the 
cognitive representations of English simulating business, but did not act upon 
the advice.
Th e respondents emphasised that the staﬀ  training conducted by the English 
consultant was meaningful for them because the legislative body had changed the 
rules dealing with promoting enterprises, granting loans for starting businesses, 
training for unemployed, etc., though a few times the staﬀ  were feeling confused 
on, e.g., how to promote enterprise. Th ey had no experience with that. Th e 
English consultant, by talking about English experiences promoting enterprise, 
opened up new ways of thinking about the issue. Th e English institutionalised 
standards of promoting enterprise served as a source of inspiration to organise 
work within the Department of the Active Labour Market Programmes, espe-
cially those concerning training for unemployed, loans for the unemployed to 
start a business, and loans for employers to help create jobs. Th e example shows 
that experts’ advice has to conform to the local situation in order to result in 
policy changes. Just promoting a standard, however useful in one’s own country, 
does not automatically result in adoption, even if respect for the expert and the 
dependence thereon is large.
When experts’ advice is not even thought useful, the chance of adoption is 
even slimmer. For instance, the French consultants promoted the French organisa-
tional fashion of the employment agency, but this was rejected by the employment 
service because it proved inadequate to Polish culture and customs in the opinion 
of those interviewed. French consultants visited the Voivodship Labour Oﬃ  ce of 
Lodz in 1993 as the ﬁ rst ILO consultants. One of the mangers admitted:
When they were telling about labour matching and vocational counsel-
ling, I had no clue what they were talking about (Interview 21/6).
French consultants tried making the staﬀ  more sensitive to the active labour 
market programmes even while the Employment Agency did not have suﬃ  cient 
means to pay out unemployment beneﬁ ts to about 86,000 registered unemployed 
persons. In the French employment agency, they keep a record of all the unem-
ployed, take notes from their discussions with unemployed persons, etc. Every-
thing has to be accurately documented. Th ose working methods were impossible 
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to conduct in Lodz because of workload; one placement oﬃ  cer had to provide 
such services to about 840 unemployed persons in 1993.
Th e French experts tried to promote their own bureaucratic model, while 
the labour oﬃ  cers needed concrete, pragmatic ideas to make the payment of ben-
eﬁ ts easier (Interviews 21/7; 17/24). Probably the French organisational fashions 
were ultimately rejected because the communication between the consultants 
and the staﬀ  was obscure and arrogant. One of managers explained:
I had participated three weeks in the French programme within the 
Voivodship Labour Oﬃ  ce of Lodz. I had declined with thanks the French 
model of Employment Agency because it was overly bureaucratic. We 
had too many unemployed persons coming to the oﬃ  ce daily. It was not 
for us. We needed the most simply roll to pay out unemployment ben-
eﬁ ts at that time /…/ At the beginning, we were not prepared to discuss 
with the Western consultants. Later on, when we had been re-trained 
and had the preliminary vision of the oﬃ  ce, we could take advantage of 
their assistance. Without re-training, we did not have a clue what our 
guests were talking about. I have said it because of my own experiences. 
When I had the problems, how to register so many unemployed persons, 
how to pay out unemployment beneﬁ ts and when the Western consult-
ants suggested to start with labour matching and vocational counsel-
ling, I did not understand them. (Interview 21/5 and 26)
Th e French experts were interested in establishing a so-called “Club of Ac-
tive Looking for Work” at the Voivodship Labour Oﬃ  ce. To this purpose, they 
started to train the vocational counsellors to prepare the local leaders who could 
conduct training for unemployed persons. Th e French “organisational fashion” of 
vocational counselling was controversial in the opinion of the interviewees:
Let us imagine, you invite the unemployed persons and ask them to write 
their life story in the pictures. Th e unemployed person is told to draw a ﬂ ower in 
which s/he is a central point of the bloom, while all the petals suggest that person’s 
social network or lack of it. I am afraid that such a vocational counsellor would 
be made fun of and people probably would leave the meeting. Th e unemployed 
persons expect a very concrete piece of advice what to do in their situation. Th e 
Swedish consultants proposed much more sensible solutions. (Interview 17/26)
Th e respondent underlined that the oﬃ  ce’s clients interpreted that form of 
vocational counselling as a silly game rather than essential assistance in looking 
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for work. Th e Polish respondents added: “Th ose humans did not deserve to be 
treated as children” (Interview 17/27).
In general, most Polish oﬃ  cials expressed the same view: “It is impossible to 
use any organisational pattern in Poland, although it worked correctly in other 
countries, without changing it” (Interview 22/40). Th is grasps the essence of the 
adaptive process; namely, that if outside experts propose measures that do not ﬁ t 
the ﬁ nancial resources, culture and structure of the recipient organisation, these 
will not be adopted no matter the reputation, the dependence relation or the ex-
ternal pressure to adapt.
4. Refl ections and conclusions
Th is paper started with the question of whether in this complex world the inﬂ u-
ence of experts in policy-making processes is increasing or decreasing. First, the 
paper addressed the core business of expertise theoretically and stressed the stand-
ardising eﬀ ect of expertise. Subsequently, we discussed the literature on the relation 
between experts and policy-makers. Here, we distinguished between the thesis that 
experts are dominant and politicians are subservient and the opposite thesis that 
policy-makers are still in charge, while the position of experts is one of subservi-
ence. Empirical data shows that in the new democracies there is considerable trust 
in outside experts, at least more trust than in old democracies. However, a case 
study involving Western assistance to a Polish employment service, under condi-
tions favouring adoption of all proposals, because of the dependence on the Polish 
part and the consequences for not adapting to EU rules, still showed that having a 
reputation as an expert is not enough to induce organisational change.
Th e case of Western assistance to the Polish employment service, with a 
focus on the Employment Agency of Lodz, shows how consultants spread the 
organisational fashions dominant in their own home countries with diﬀ erent 
success. Not all the organisational fashions suited the Polish realities during the 
transition from socialism to a market economy. Some of them were contrary to 
the domestic regulation of the labour market policy, the ﬁ nancial possibilities or 
even the cultural customs. Th is seems to be determinative for the degree to which 
such fashions are adopted. Th e Swedish, German and Danish experts provided 
the most meaningful organisational fashions and these were adopted. Conversely 
the French and English experts’ advice was not adopted, simply because there was 
no ﬁ t with the recipient organisation. In terms of Røvik’s fashion perspective, the 
former could make a contribution in solving the problems of the Employment 
Agency, the problems associated to its adaptation to a market economy, and those 
related to the creation of a modern public employment service. Th is implies that 
the adopters from Lodz followed their own principles of rationality and made de-
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cisions that Røvik would describe as “a compromise between norms of rationality 
and norms of fashionables” (Røvik, 1996: 167).
Although a single case study is presented and generalizations based thereon 
are by deﬁ nition hazardous, it is possible to derive two hypothesizes about the 
role of experts in the local policy-making processes. Th e ﬁ rst hypothesis reads 
that even under the most unfavourable circumstances, in terms of dependency 
and reputation of experts, policy-makers still decide for themselves which advice 
to follow and they base this solely on experts’ advice if that advice is sound. Sec-
ond, if experts do not take the contingencies of the local situation, culture and 
structure into account, their advice is likely to be ignored. If, however, they listen 
and help to solve real problems, their recommendations are likely to be adopted 
by the recipient organisation.
In conclusion, this case study proposes a way to investigate as well as a pre-
liminary answer to the question of whether experts or policy-makers are dominant 
in the policy-making process. It suggests selecting cases based on speciﬁ c features 
in the relation between policy-makers and experts; e.g., the inclination by policy-
makers to listen to experts and their dependency on those experts. It hypotheses 
that even when the inclination to listen to experts is high and the dependence ther-
eon is large, the policy-makers’ view still seems to be determinative for the actions 
taken and that even in this case, experts only are inﬂ uential if they have ideas that 
are sound in the conception of the policy-makers. Th ese have to be ideas that ﬁ t the 
circumstances in which the recommendations require a follow-up. Furthermore, it 
implies that theories on technocracy, technocratic behaviour and the power of ex-
perts in relation to policy-makers are in need of more empirical research. Research 
that investigates the relative impact of substantial and strategic factors is needed 
for understanding the inﬂ uence of expertise in policy-making processes.
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